PRACTICA

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Cosmopolitan Sentiments in the United States from 1982–2017: Attitudes Among the Young, Middle-Aged, and the Elderly[4]

Abstract

The current study attempts to examine the sentiments of liberal cosmopolitanism in the United States in recent decades and fill the gaps in the literature in three ways. First, we propose a new multidimensional measure of cosmopolitanism relying on the data from the World Values Surveys; second, we try to see whether there is a trend toward being more or less cosmopolitan in the USA from 1982 to 2017; and third, we explore whether there exist age-related variations in public attitudes. The results lend credence to our hypotheses: (1) The overall support for cosmopolitanism has been on the rise – even in the new century under a shifted political atmosphere. (2) The age-related differences in support for cosmopolitanism has become wider over the last four decades.

Keywords

Age effect, cosmopolitanism, globalization, the USA, time series stacked data, Trump.

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1. Introduction

On September 24, 2019, former US President Donald Trump declared in his address to the UN assembly, that "The future does not belong to the globalists. The future belongs to patriots"[5]. His promise that better days are ahead should be taken with a grain of salt. Unilateralism has been his driving philosophy as well as the hallmark of his approach to global affairs. Trump's declaration represented a significant rupture from the American policies of the post-WWII[6]. Economic globalization as well as the fast development of instant and mobile communication have been eroding the political independence of nation-states, a hallmark of global industrialization since the Enlightenment Age. Living in such an environment, Americans, as a nation of immigrants, have been exposed to the increasingly more diversified new waves of immigrants and they have also been exposed to the idea of the world citizen.

The idea of cosmopolitanism originated from the Stoics and Cynics writings[7]. The idea can also be found in Confucianism in China[8]. It refers to the general idea that one alleges to belong to the world community as opposed to the community or geo-location into which one was born. In modern times, the idea was associated with the expansion of capitalism from Europe with philosophers such as Kant, connecting cosmopolitanism with a universalistic orientation toward world community[9]. The attraction of cosmopolitanism for liberal-minded social scientists consists in part of its normative orientation, which is especially relevant to transnationalism and the growing consciousness of globality[10].

Cosmopolitanism and nationalism are perennial themes in sociological and political studies. These concepts are often framed as an opposing dichotomy, but it is also possible to view them as an integrated conceptual frame that embodies both nationalism and world citizenship with patriotic obligations[11]. This is because the concept of nationalism itself is complex. In a nutshell, it involves two types of nationalism: liberal and illiberal nationalism[12]. Illiberal na-

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[5] The Guardian. 2019. Trump denounced globalism. https://www.theguardian.com/us–news/2019/sep/24/donald–trump–un–address–denounces–globalism

[6] V. K. A g g a r w a l. 2016. Introduction: The rise of mega–FTAs and the Asian–Pacific. Asian Survey 56(6): 1005–1016.

[7] G. D e l a n t y, B. He. 2008. Cosmopolitan perspectives on European and Asian transnationalism. International Sociology 23(3): 323–344.

[8] See F. P i c h l e r. 2009. 'Down–to–earth' cosmopolitanism. Current Sociology 57 (5), p. 706.

[9] J. B o h m a n, M. L u t z - B a c h m a n n. 1997. Perpetual Peace: Essays on Kant's Cosmopolitan Ideal. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

[10] R. K. M e r t o n. 1964. Social Theory and Social Structure. London: The Free Press.

[11] A. B. B a y r a m. 2019. Nationalist cosmopolitanism: the psychology of cosmopolitanism, national identity, and going to war for the country. Nations and Nationalism 25 (3): 757–781.; also see M. C. N u s s b a u m. 2008. Toward a globally sensitive patriotism. Daedlus 137(3): 78–93.

[12] Sse D. B r o w n. 1999. Are there good and bad nationalisms? Nations and Nationalism, 5(2): 281–302.

tionalism is a primordial, exclusivist, and cultural ideology of blood and soil whereas liberal nationalism is an inclusivist ideology built around political ideas of citizenship and human rights.

Against this backdrop, the current study probes a version of cosmopolitanism with a focus on tolerance, trusting different people, and lack of nationalism. Put simply, we investigate a version of liberal cosmopolitanism, looking specifically at the value fluctuations in the contemporary USA. Note that we are not interested in the globalization process, defined as the increase in the exchange of goods, capital, labor, and information across nations[13].

Surprisingly, as the world's largest immigrant society with the most diversified racial and ethnic population, American rank regarding the percentage of people who think that they are world citizens is not high: either in the middle[14] or in the lower quarter[15]. There are three major weaknesses in the current literature on American cosmopolitanism. First, despite the increasing literature on the topic, the measure of cosmopolitanism is largely unidimensional and in disarray whereas the concept is complex and should be multidimensionally measured. Second, the existing literature relies largely on cross-sectional data. While they could provide a snapshot at a one-time point, pooled repeated time series data can provide more robust results – such as the effect of age, period, and cohort[16]. Besides containing richer information, they can demonstrate the trend of cosmopolitanism. Third, the effect of birth cohorts (e.g., generation) on cosmopolitanism has not been examined. As a result, the current study attempts to address all of the above weaknesses in the literature and advance our understanding of American cosmopolitanism.

In addition to the gap in the literature, the escalating political polarizations and antagonism within the United States also triggered our curiosity. There has been a recent resurgence of extreme tendency on both the political left and right wings,

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[13] U. B e c k, N. S z n a i d e r. 2006 Unpacking cosmopolitanism for the social sciences: A research agenda. The British Journal of Sociology 57(1): 1–23.

[14] S. S c h u e t h, J. O'L o u g h l i n. 2008. Belonging to the world: Cosmopolitanism in geographic contexts. Geoforum 39: 926–941.

[15] A. B. B a y r a m. 2015. What drives modern Diogenes? Individual values and cosmopolitan allegiance. European Journal of International Relations 21 (2): 451–479.; 33. S. M c F a r l a n d, M. W e b b, D. B r o w n. 2012. All humanity is my in–group: A measure and studies of identification with all humanity. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 103 (5): 830–853.; M. Z h o u. 2016. Social and individual sources of self–identification as global citizens: Evidence from the interactive multilevel model. Socio–logical Perspectives 59 (1): 153–176.

[16] L. C a o, X. M e i, Y. L i. 2024. Correlates of severity in mass public shootings in the United States, 1966–2022. Journal of Applied Security Research, online first.; P. N o r r i s, R. I n g l e h a r t. 2009. Is national diversity under threat? Cosmopolitan communications and cultural convergence. Available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1451377; L. S h i, Y. Lu, J. T. P i c k e t t. 2020. The public salience of crime, 1960–2014: Age–period–cohort and time–series analyses. Criminology 58(3): 568–593.

especially after the 2008 Financial Crisis[17]. Suffering manufacturing working class in the Rust Belt demanded protectionism against globalization; activists in the Occupy movements urged heavy redistributive tax on the rich; conservatives in the rural areas enthusiastically mobilized campaigns against all immigrants, both legal and illegal[18]. In the process, the ideals of cosmopolitanism are seen as unrealistic or even pure evil, and it seems only the beneficiaries of post-Cold-War globalization, such as the Wall Street and Silicon Valley giants would embrace them[19]. With that, it becomes more vital to understand whether there is a trend in how Americans view cosmopolitanism over time. It is also important to compare the attitudes of different age groups because individual perceptions and behaviors are influenced by factors related to their age, sociohistoric events, and the birth cohort they belong to[20]. If younger individuals' stance on cosmopolitanism in recent years is distinct from that of older individuals from the 1980s, the current study may prognosticate possible emerging American political culture.

We are particularly interested in answering the following questions: How have cosmopolitan values changed in the past four decades, and are there age group differences in cosmopolitan attitudes? We employ the USA samples from the World Values Survey (hereafter WVS) Data (1982-2017) to answer the questions. By constructing an index of cosmopolitanism based on recent works, we present the trend of cosmopolitan values across WVS surveys and the cosmopolitan perceptions of three major age groups (those in their 20s, 50s, and 80s) representing the youths, middle-aged, and the elderly at each time point. We then discuss our findings in the context of the contemporary USA and their implications in the studies of public opinion and global political culture.

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[17] J. J. D y c k, S. P e a r s o n - M e r k o w i t z, M. C o a t e s. 2018. Primary distrust: Political distrust and support for the insurgent candidacies of Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders in the 2016 primary. PS: Political Science & Politics 51(2), 351–357; M. H o o g h e, R. D a s s o n n e v i l l e. 2018. Explaining the Trump vote: The effect of racist resentment and antiimmigrant sentiments. PS: Political Science & Politics 51(3): 528–534.

[18] A. R. H o c h s c h i l d. 2018. Strangers in their own land: Anger and mourning on the American right. The New Press; L. M c C a l l, J. M a n z a. 2011. Class differences in social and political attitudes in the United States. The Oxford Handbook of American Public Opinion and the Media. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

[19] C. C a l h o u n. 2003. The class consciousness of frequent travelers: A critique of actually existing cosmopolitanism" Pp. 86–116 in Daniele Archibugi (ed.), Debating Cosmopolitics. London: Verso.; M. Ossewaarde. 2007. Cosmopolitanism and the society of strangers. Current Sociology 55(3): 367–88.

[20] A. G r a h a m, C. J. J o n s o n, H. L e e. 2022. Back in my day: Generational beliefs about school shootings. Criminal Justice Review 47(3): 369–398.; H. L e e, F. T. C u l l e n, A. L. B u r t o n, V. S. Jr. B u r t o n. 2022. Millennials as the future of corrections: A generational analysis of public policy opinions. Crime & Delinquency 68(12): 2355–2392.

2. The Concept of Cosmopolitanism and Its Empirical Measures

The notion of cosmopolitanism is by its nature multi-dimensional[21]. Previous studies have at least proposed the following aspects in the notion of cosmopolitanism: (1) An idea of unity beyond national identities vis-à-vis nationalism; (2) a belief that racial, cultural, and religious diversities could enrich one's well-being as opposed to xenophobia; (3) a globalist attitude towards free trade instead of protectionism; and (4) a demand for more global governance over issues like environmental threats.

While former President Trump declared the policies of the American First and the death penalty to globalism[22], public opinions are much more nuanced and complex[23]. The popularity of cosmopolitanism is important to investigate because it sets the stage for future-oriented policy initiatives. If Americans are indeed internally oriented, it gives room for the continuing growth of extreme right-wing ideology, self-isolationism, and anti-immigration emotion. Alternatively, if Americans intend to continue to lead the world, we have to embrace policies that would nurture the growth of social liberalism[24], which is closely related to cosmopolitanism[25].

Most published papers focus on comparisons among nations[26]. Using data from the fifth wave of the World Values Survey (2005-2008), Bayram (2015) measured cosmopolitan allegiance with a single item of four ordinal categories of strongly agree, agree, or disagree to the question that "I see myself as a citizen of the world". Multinomial logit model was utilized to analyze data. Cosmopolitanism was found to be related to universalism, benevolence, hedonism, achievement power, stimulation, conformity, security trust, religiosity, urbanism and ideology. Those who are younger are more likely to be cosmopolitan.

Selecting 21 countries from the third wave (1995-1997) of the WVS, Schueth and O'Loughlin[27] created a measure of cosmopolitanism as a binary measure by combining two items of belonging to "the world as a whole" as

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[21] G. D e l a n t y, B. H e, *op. cit*; F. P i c h l e r, *op. cit*.

[22] R. Ziv, A. G r a h a m, L. C a o. 2019. America first? Trump, crime, and justice internationally. Victims & Offenders 14 (8): 997–1009.

[23] U. B e c k, N. S z n a i d e r, *op. cit*.

[24] L. C a o, D. S e l m a n. 2010. Children of the common mother: Social determinants of liberalism in the U.S. and Canada. Sociological Focus 43 (4): 311–329; S. S t a c k, A. A d a m c z y k, L. C a o. 2010. Survivalism and public opinion on criminality: A cross-national analysis of prostitution. Social Forces 88 (4): 1703–1726; Ziv et al., *op .cit*.

[25] A. B. B a y r a m, What drives…, *op. cit*.; J. K. J u n g. 2008. Growing supranational identities in a globalizing world?. European Journal of Political Research 47(5): 578–609; F. P i c h l e r. 2011. Cosmopolitanism in a global perspective. International Sociology 27 (1): 21–50.

[26] A. B. B a y r a m, What drives…, *op. cit*.; F u r i a, 2005; G o r m a n and S e g u i n, 2018; J u n g 2008; P i c h l e r, Cosmopolitanism…, *op. cit*.; 2011; S. S c h u e t h, J. L o u g h l i n, *op. cit*.; M. Z h o u, *op. cit*.

[27] S. S c h u e t h, J. O'L o u g h l i n, *op. cit*.

1 and all other categories as 0. Cosmopolitanism is defined as a characteristic of individual respondents who chose "the world as a whole" as their first or second choice of the geographic group to which they belong. The effect of age was negatively related to cosmopolitanism. That is, younger individuals are more likely to be cosmopolitan. Both Bayram's[28] and Schueth and O'Loughlin's[29] studies capture "cosmopolitan identity" or feelings of belonging or attachment to the world as a whole (belonging to the geolocation) as the measure of cosmopolitanism.

In an effort to understand whether people who believe in cosmopolitanism are more privileged than those who do not, Furia[30] differentiated moral cosmopolitanism (belonging to the world) and political cosmopolitanism (confidence in the UN). Using data from 1999-2002 World Values Survey and the 2004 Inter-university Survey on Allegiance, he did not find any empirical evidence that cosmopolitanism appeals only to the rationalist, or systemically to privileged individuals or to privileged societies. The study failed to control for the effect of age.

Focusing on the relationship between cosmopolitan practices and cosmopolitan beliefs, Phillips and Smith[31] looked at cosmopolitan "on the ground" as action and as attitudes. They found that cosmopolitan practices in Australia drove up cosmopolitan outlooks that one felt comfortable when a family from an Indian, Greek, Aboriginal, Lebanese or Vietnamese background moved in the next door. Those who are younger, better-educated, secular people are more receptive to the presence of other ethnic neighbors. Their data are cross-sectional and their measure of cosmopolitan outlook is simplistic and raw, however.

More sophisticated measure of cosmopolitans was created with multiple dimensions. Relying on data from European Values Study (1999-2000), Pischler[32] created a measure of cosmopolitan orientation with nine items, centering attitudes toward immigration and characteristics of neighbors and the degree of concern about humanity with a particular emphasis on foreigners. In the hierarchical linear model, males, higher incomers and better educated had more cosmopolitan orientation while age was negatively related to it. In another study, Pischler[33] experimented with multidimensions of cosmopolitan orientations, grasping both people's self-views as world citizens and cosmopolitan orientation. The principal component analysis resulted in two

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[28] A. B. B a y r a m, What drives…, *op. cit*.

[29] S. S c h u e t h, J. O'Loughlin, *op. cit*.

[30] P. A. F u r i a. 2005. Global citizenship, anyone? Cosmopolitanism, privilege and public opinion. Global Society 19 (4): 331–359.

[31] T. P h i l l i p s, P. S m i t h, P. 2008. Cosmopolitan beliefs and cosmopolitan practices: An empirical investigation, Journal of Sociology 44 (4), p. 392.

[32] F. P i c h l e r, 'Down–to–earth'…, *op. cit*.

[33] F. P i s c h l e r, Cosmopolitanism…, *op. cit*.

dimensions: the first included items of trust in different people, tolerance toward diverse people and openness toward diversity. This measure was called "ethical cosmopolitan orientation". The second component included global political decision-making and nationalism. It was labeled as "political cosmopolitanism". The fixed effects hierarchical regression models show that age is negatively related to ethical cosmopolitan orientation and political cosmopolitan, meaning that younger people score higher on both indexes while males are more cosmopolitan on both indexes.

Jung[34] provided one of the rare time-series data analyses of cosmopolitan and supranational identities from 1981 to 2001. He found that the younger generations are more supranational. He concluded that cosmopolitan attitudes and supranational identities did not increase during the temporal scope of the study. Another time-series data analyses (1980-2004) of cosmopolitan identity by Norris and Inglehart[35] suggest that cosmopolitan identity is positively related to giving priority to reducing poverty in the world, negatively with imposing strict limits on foreign workers, and positively with favorable views on ethnic diversity[36]. Neither of these studies examined the effect of age.

Another multidimensional measure of cosmopolitanism was proposed by Zhou[37], who attempted to gauge individuals' global self-identification in relation to self-identification with nation-states. It was constructed by two questionnaire items in the WVS: (1) how strongly you agree or disagree that "I see myself as a world citizen," and (2) how strongly you agree or disagree that "I see myself as part of the nation." The "strongly disagree" category was coded as 1, disagree as 2, agree as 3, and strongly agree as 4, so a higher score indicates a higher level of self-identification. The first item generates a score of "seeing myself as a world citizen," while the second item provides a score of "seeing myself as part of the nation." The difference between the two scores was calculated, which ranges from −3 (lowest global self-identification) to 3 (highest global self-identification). Finally, a 7-point scale ranging from 0 (lowest global self-identification) to 6 (highest global self-identification) was constructed by adding 3 to the difference. A higher score indicates a greater degree of global (relative to national) self-identification. In general, people with cosmopolitan ideas are more trusting of other people who are different from them in terms of religion, ethnicity and sexual orientation, and therefore more open toward diversity. Age was negatively and education was positively related to cosmopolitanism in their multi-level models of global self-identification.

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[34] J. K. J u n g, *op. cit.*
[35] P. N o r r i s, R. I n g l e h a r t, *op. cit.*
[36] *Ibidem.*
[37] M. Z h o u, *op. cit.*

Contrary to the conventional thinking[38] that cosmopolitanism should be positively associated with elite, better education, and higher income, Gorman and Seguin[39] posited that insecurity and threat experienced by members of marginalized groups and people on the periphery of the global system as a result of repressive states prompt people to search for reliable allies internationally, resulting in stronger pro-global identities in the process. Their results show that both neglected and marginalized groups are statistically significantly more pro-global than the more dominant and powerful groups. Age has an occasionally weak negative effect on identifying with the global identity.

Several observations are in order from this literature review. First, although the idea of cosmopolitanism seems to be simple and straightforward, its measures are quite diversified[40]. Various aspects of cosmopolitanism have been captured, such as cosmopolitan allegiance[41], cosmopolitan identity[42], moral cosmopolitanism[43], political cosmopolitanism[44], cosmopolitan practices and beliefs[45], ethical cosmopolitanism[46], cosmopolitan orientation[47], and self-identification cosmopolitanism[48]. Building on these insights, we believe that the concept of cosmopolitanism should be investigated as multidimensional attitudes and values. Therefore, this study constructs a measure of liberal cosmopolitanism that focuses on three key dimensions: tolerance, trust in people with different religions and/or nationalities, and lack of national preoccupation. This measure taps humanity as a whole as well as one's religion and nationality.

Second, few studies have exclusively focused on American cosmopolitanism and its long-term trend. The only two investigations with stacked longitudinal data used a single-item measure of cosmopolitanism and both failed to examine the effect of age[49]. With the newly developed multidimensional measure of liberal cosmopolitanism, the present study examines the general trend of American cosmopolitan sentiments over the past four decades and explores the cosmopolitan attitudes of differing age groups at each time point.

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[38] P. Norris, R. Inglehart, *op. cit.*; M. Ossewaarde, *op. cit.*

[39] B. Gorman, C. Seguin. 2018. World citizens on the periphery: Threat and identification with global society. American Journal of Sociology 124(3): 705–761.

[40] See S. McFarland, J. Hackett, K. Hamer, I. Katzarska-Miller, A. Malsch, G. Reese, S. Reysen. 2019. Global human identification and citizenship: A review of psychological studies, Advances in Political Psychology 40, Suppl 1, 141–171.

[41] A. B. Bayram, What drives…, *op. cit.*

[42] B. Gorman, C. Seguin, *op. cit.*; S. Schueth, J. O'Loughlin, *op. cit.*

[43] P. A. Furia, *op. cit.*

[44] P. A. Furia, *op. cit.*; Pichler 2011.

[45] T. Phillips, P. Smith, *op. cit.*

[46] F. Picher, Cosmopolitanism…, *op. cit.*

[47] F. Picher, 'Down–to–earth'…, *op. cit.*; F. Picher, Cosmopolitanism…, *op. cit.*

[48] M. Zhou, *op. cit.*

[49] J. K. Jung, *op. cit.*; P. Norris, R. Inglehart, *op. cit.*

3. Hypotheses

In the 20th century, the disastrous impacts of the World Wars have driven more people to reflect on the negative side of nationalism and begin to embrace cosmopolitanism. The expansion of the global market, the end of the Cold War, and the development of the Internet, including the recent AI, all led to a seemingly promising future of unity of all mankind[50]. From the psychological viewpoint, fully mature individuals care deeply for all humanity, not just for their own ingroups[51]. A good society must be a just and inclusive one[52].

According to the human emancipation theory[53], people growing up in an affluent and secure environment would be more likely to be open-minded, trustful, tolerant, and liberal on various social issues, such as immigration, environmental protection, sexual minorities and preference of cosmopolitanism over nationalism[54]. As a result, in developed countries, an overall trend for the support of cosmopolitanism seems likely, reflecting the higher tolerance of immigration and multiculturalism. Moreover, considering the tendency for younger individuals to exhibit more progressive attitudes than their older counterparts[55] and the increasing polarization of public support for political and social issues in the United States[56], it is conceivable that variations in cosmopolitan attitudes exist among individuals of different age groups. Thus, we propose the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1: The overall support for cosmopolitanism in the USA rose between 1982 and 2017.

Hypothesis 2: The support for cosmopolitanism in the USA diverged across age groups; while younger Americans are becoming increasingly more cosmopolitan, older Americans are not as much.

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[50] R. I n g l e h a r t, W. E. B a k e r. 2000. Modernization, cultural change, and the persistence of traditional values. American Sociological Review 65(1): 19–51; C. W e l z e l 2013. Freedom Rising: Human Empowerment and the Quest for Emancipation. New York: Cambridge University Press.

[51] S. M c F a r l a n d, M. W e b b, D. B r o w n, *op. cit*.

[52] F. T. C u l l e n. 1994. Social support as an organizing concept for criminology: Presidential address to the Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences. Justice Quarterly 11(4): 527–559; J. Y o u n g. 2011. The Criminological Imagination. London, UK: Polity.

[53] R. I n g l e h a r t, C. W e l z e l. 2005. Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy: The Human Development Sequence. Cambridge University Press.; C. W e l z e l, *op. cit*.

[54] L. C a o, D. S e l m a n. 2010. Children of the common mother: Social determinants of liberalism in the U.S. and Canada. Sociological Focus 43 (4): 311–329.; T. H. Z h a n g, J. S u n, L. C a o. 2020. Education, internet use, and confidence in the police. Asian Journal of Criminology 16 (2): 165–182.

[55] H. L e e et al., *op. cit*.; T. H. Z h a n g et al., *op. cit*.

[56] Pew Research Center. June 12, 2014. Political polarization in the American Public. Available at https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2014/06/12/political–polarization–in–the–american–public/.

4. Methods

USA Data (1982-2017) from the World Values Survey Wave 1–7

The data used in our study come from the American samples from all waves of the World Values Survey (hereafter WVS). The WVS project is one of the largest international survey programs so far. It is appropriate for the current study as it focuses on public opinion, political culture, and values. In each country, the WVS team collects representative samples. The WVS has surveyed seven waves from 1981 to 2020; in the United States, the seven waves were conducted in 1982, 1990, 1995, 1999, 2006, 2011, and 2017, respectively. Such temporal coverage would help to reveal value change trends that took place in the recent four decades. Furthermore, most of the questions used in the WVS are consistent across waves and countries, which enables longitudinal analysis of the trends.

The variable used in the study is an index of cosmopolitanism. We construct this index based on previous works measuring cosmopolitanism, including Furia[57], Pichler[58], and Zhou[59]. We chose four variables to construct the cosmopolitan measure in this study: (1) "self-identity as a world citizen"; (2) "tolerance of other race/ethnicity"; (3) "attitudes towards ethnic diversity" and (4) "trust in foreigners"[60]. These items were selected as they are available in all waves of WVS and consistent across waves (see Table 1); they also have high response rates. To be specific, our index combines measurements of the following dimensions. People's trust and tolerance in outgroups (e.g. immigrants and people of other races, binary variables ranging from 0-1); acceptance of cultural diversity (1-10), the strength of national identity (1-4, reversely coded), and self-identity of world citizen (1-4). Factor analysis indicates that all the items load on one latent construct. We standardized the items on the 0–1 scale, take the average, and rescale it into a 1 to 10 scale to construct the cosmopolitanism index.

To demonstrate temporal changes in Americans' cosmopolitan attitudes, we first visualize the time trend of each of the four cosmopolitanism items in Figure 1. Then, using the composite cosmopolitan index, we plotted the level of cosmopolitanism from three age groups (those aged between 20-29, 50-59, and 80-89) at each time point in Figure 2. These three age groups were selected to represent young, middle-aged, and old Americans. The figures help to test both hypotheses of whether there is a trend in Americans' atti-

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[57] P. A. F u r i a, *op. cit*.

[58] F. P i c h e r, 'Down–to–earth'…, *op. cit*.; F. P i c h e r, Cosmopolitanism…, *op. cit*.

[59] M. Z h o u, *op. cit*.

[60] L. C a o, J. Z h a o, L. R e n, R. Z h a o. 2015. Do in–group and out–group trusts matter in predicting confidence in order institutions: A study of three culturally distinctive countries. International Sociology 30: 674–693.

tudes toward cosmopolitanism over time and whether age-related variations in cosmopolitan perceptions exist at the time of the survey.

Table 1. Coding for Items used in Constructing the Cosmopolitanism Index.

Items	Variables	Coding	Mean (SD)
Self-identity as a World Citizen	"I see myself as a world citizen"	Strongly disagree=1 Disagree=4 Agree=7 Strongly Agree=10	6.26 (2.88)
Attitudes Toward Diversity	"Ethnic diversity enriches my life/hurts the unity of society"	A continuous rating from 1-10 where: Diversity hurts=1 Diversity enriches=10	6.81 (2.53)
Outgroup Tolerance	"Gender Trust of Others"	Don't trust at all=1 Don't trust very much=4 Trust somewhat=7 Trust completely=10	4.65 (4.42)
	"Do you mind people of other races as your neighbor"	Yes=1 No=10	9.46 (2.14)
	"Do you mind immigrants as your neighbor"	Yes=1 No=10	9.06 (2.74)
Strength of Nationalism	"I would fight for my country in a war"	Yes=1 No=10	3.90 (4.21)
	"I feel proud of my country"	Strongly agree=1 Agree=4 Disagree=7 Strongly Disagree=10	2.34 (2.08)

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5. Results

From Figure 1, we can see that for all four cosmopolitan items, the overall trajectory demonstrates an upward trend: Americans are indeed becoming more cosmopolitan, tolerant, and open-minded across time.

Figure 1. Trends of Cosmopolitan Values in the USA, 1982–2017.

Trends of Cosmopolitan Values in the USA, 1982-2017

All indicators standardized to 0-1 scales (which are equivalent to percentages for binary variables).

We notice from Figure 1 that, in the 21st century (WVS Wave 5-7), there have been fluctuations and fallbacks in support for the cosmopolitan items. Such fallbacks are understandable as many Americans were frustrated by the terrorist attacks since 9-11, the alleged shrinking middle class and the lost jobs since the 2008 Financial crisis, and the rising number of immigrants[61]. People claimed that they failed by the globalist elites and their optimistic promises about the future; many of them turned to populist politicians, left or right[62].

Regarding the second hypothesis, we looked at three age groups: those whose ages are in their 20s, in their 50s, and in their 80s. We observe that people tend to become less cosmopolitan over their life courses and the gap between different age cohorts seems to have expanded even more in recent years – indicating a less consensus in cosmopolitanism among generations.

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[61] J. J. G r a h a m et al. *op. cit.*; M. H o o g h e, R. D a s s o n n e v i l l e, *op. cit*.
[62] J. J. D y c k et al., *op. cit*.

Figure 2. Survey Year, Age and Cosmopolitanism in the USA, 1982–2017.

Fitted values are from Model 2. All variables except education and freedom are set to typical values (i.e., means for quantitative variables and proportions for categorical variable)

In Figure 2, we can see that those in their 20s in recent years are even more cosmopolitan compared to those in their 20s in the 1980s; their level of cosmopolitanism was about 5.4 between 1982 and 1999, and climbed up to about 6.0 between 2006 and 2011, and reached nearly 6.4 in 2017. In comparison, the change in cosmopolitan attitudes among Americans in their 50s was less drastic as the score increased moderately from 5.4 to 5.8. Finally, the support for cosmopolitanism among those aged stayed about the same, scoring about 5.4 for nearly forty years. To sum up, we find empirical evidence supporting the two research hypotheses: overall, the American public has become more cosmopolitan in the past four decades – with widening gaps between younger and older individuals. Since the 2000s, young Americans or those born after the late 1970s (i.e., Millennials and Gen Xers) showed substantially more cosmopolitan attitudes than their older counterparts or those born before the 1930s (i.e., Silent Generation) whose cosmo-

politan attitudes remained largely unchanged. At the same time, people in their 50s (i.e., Baby Boomers or those born between 1946 and 1964) in America exhibited a shift toward more cosmopolitan attitudes, albeit to a lesser extent compared to younger generations.

6. Discussions and Conclusion

In the present study, we have constructed a new measure of liberal cosmopolitanism. Relying on the stacked time series data of the WVS between 1982 and 2017, we present the trend of cosmopolitanism with this measure over almost 40 years in the United States. We conclude that there is an overall linear upward trend to be more cosmopolitan in terms of tolerance and trust although there was a slight dip in self-identification as a world citizen and in attitudes toward diversity in the latest wave of 2017.

The test of the second research hypothesis shows that there is a diversion between the young and old age groups of Americans: younger Americans' values of cosmopolitanism have changed faster, consistent with research on the emancipation theory[63], with empirical findings between age and cosmopolitanism in cross-sectional data[64], and generational differences[65]. Our study adds evidence drawing from employing a multi-dimensional measure of cosmopolitanism and time series stacked longitudinal data.

Several points of our discoveries are worth further discussion. First, from the early 1980s to the late 2010s, there has been a clear trend of increasing support for the idea of cosmopolitanism. This trend fits the pattern predicted by the emancipatory theory[66]. With the spread of Trump's ideology[67], these emotions may have been exaggerated and as a result, the ideals of cosmopolitanism might become less appealing after the Trump administration than before. However, most people still do care about problems in the world, such as the territorial disputes between Israel and Palestine and between Ukraine and Russia, climate change and/or environmental pollution, that defy the national borders.

Second, we find that young Americans continue to be more cosmopolitan while the middle-aged and elder groups are somewhat stagnant in embrac-

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[63] R. I n g l e h a r t, C. W e l z e l, *op. cit*.; W e l z e l, *op. cit*.

[64] A. B. B a y r a m, What drives… *op. cit*.; A. B. B a y r a m, Nationalist…, *op. cit*.; C a o, L., and M a g u i r e, E. R. 2013. A test of the temperance hypothesis: Class, religiosity, and tolerance of prostitution. Social Problems 60(2), 188–205; S. M c F a r l a n d et al., All humanity…, *op. cit*.; F. P i c h e r, 'Down–to–earth'…, *op. cit*.; F. P i c h e r, Cosmopolitanism…, *op. cit*.; T. P h i l l i p s, P. S m i t h, *op. cit*.; S. S c h u e t h, J. O'L o u g h l i n, *op. cit*.; M. Z h o u, *op. cit*.

[65] J. T w e n g e. 2017. iGen: Why today's super–connected kids are growing up with less rebellious, more tolerant, less happy–and completely unprepared for adulthood. Atriabooks.

[66] R. I n g l e h a r t, W. E. B a k e r, *op. cit*.; R. I n g l e h a r t, C. W e l z e l, *op. cit*.

[67] R. Z i v et al., *op. cit*.

ing cosmopolitanism. Such differences can be attributed to the fact people grow up in different socialization processes and historical contexts, which shape their values through families, schools, churches, peers, and media[68]. It can also be attributed to the natural changes in one's life course. Although the test of the effects of age, period, and cohort is beyond the study of our study, our findings indicate that the generational gap may exist in Americans' cosmopolitan attitudes and that it may continue to expand in the United States. Such demographic and attitudinal shifts will likely have an enduring effect on American politics and culture in the foreseeable future.

However, it is also possible that the increase in cosmopolitanism may not persist in the United States given the rapid socioeconomic changes. The political narrative of the Trump administration directs national focus towards immigrants and foreign competition, neglecting the impact of automation and the transition to new energy sources. Republicans have been united under Trump's "hard-edge nationalism" with its "gut-level cultural appeals and hard lines on trade and immigration"[69]. The Trump presidency exacerbated pre-existing negative feelings regarding immigration and attitudes towards minorities, particularly Blacks and Muslims, that were already prevalent among certain segments of the American public.

The Trump phenomenon has garnered unprecedented political attention. It represents a symptom of contradictions in the political economy promising the American Dream for all while catering to the wealthiest one percent. It coincides with the lapse from the widening income gap in the new millennium and the declining social justice, paving the road toward authoritarianism. Recent studies reveal that the Republican public has embraced Trump's exclusionary vision of America, favoring monotheistic religions while disfavoring others[70]. Faith in Trump is found to be related to white nationalism or a desire to keep the United States white demographically and culturally, racial resentment[71], and refusal to keep social distance during the pandemic[72].

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[68] T. H. Zhang et al., *op. cit.*

[69] L. M. Bartels. 2018. Partisanship in the Trump Era, The Journal of Politics 80(40): 1483–1494, p. 1483.

[70] *Ibidem.*

[71] A. Graham, F. Cullen, L. Butler, A. Burton, V. Burton, Jr. (2021). Who wears the MAGA hat? Racial beliefs and faith in Trump. Socius, 7, 1–16.; M. Hooghe, R. Dassonneville, *op. cit.*; M. D. Reisig, K. Holtfreter, and F. T. Cullen. 2022. Faith in Trump and the willingness to punish white–collar crime: Chinese Americans as an out–group. Journal of Experimental Criminology, 12:1–27.

[72] F. Cullen, A. Graham, C. Jonson, J. Pickett, M. Sloan, M. Haner. 2022. The denier in chief: Faith in Trump and techniques of neutralization in a pandemic. Deviant Behavior. 43(7): 829–851; A.Graham, F. Cullen, J. Pickett, C. Jonson, M. Haner, M. Sloan. 2020. Faith in Trump, moral foundations, and social distancing defiance during the coronavirus pandemic. Socius, 6, 1–23.

Allegiance to Trump is also found to increase the targeting of Chinese Americans as out-group members[73].

This study acknowledges some limitations. First, the term "cosmopolitanism" is subject to theoretical debate and differing interpretations[74]. Second, the latest survey took place in 2017 while the unexpected Covid-19 pandemic swept the world in 2020. With the rise of vaccine nationalism regarding the distribution of vaccines, the contention has triggered the deeply seated culture of isolationism that is hostile to international organizations (e.g., the WTO and UN) and to cosmopolitanism, posting a new challenge to the continuing growth of cosmopolitanism in the United States. Similarly, the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 is a testimony of the dark side of ethnic nationalism. Third, Trump is running to become president of the USA again in 2024 with his MAGA agenda. It seems that most Republicans have been energized by cultural conservatism, which includes support for pro-life, concerns about discrimination against Whites, and negative feelings toward Muslims, gays and lesbians, atheists, and immigrants among others. A fuller impact of these sociopolitical events on cosmopolitanism may only be revealed in the next few rounds of data collection.

Despite these considerations, the data employed in this study covered the period before the end of former President Trump's term (2017-2021) and may have captured the early influence of his presidential term. The fact remains clear, however: cosmopolitanist ideas are not dead and a future with the cosmopolitan ideal remains possible. Admittedly, cosmopolitanism is an idea not yet fully realized and it may take a long time before it becomes a social reality. It is, however, worth our efforts to build a good society where the poor and disadvantaged[75] will be taken care of, regardless of whether they are U.S. citizens or not. A cosmopolitan imagination could play a role in shaping criminology, contributing alongside other academic disciplines, to make a modest impact on global justice[76]. The United States has the potential to evolve into a fertile ground for the expansion of the ideal of cosmopolitanism. The present study shows optimism regarding the potential transition from older generations to a younger, more politically open-minded American public. We are hopeful.

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Nastroje kosmopolityczne w Stanach Zjednoczonych w latach 1982–2017: Postawy wśród osób młodych, w średnim wieku i starszych

Streszczenie

Niniejsze badanie ma na celu zbadanie nastrojów liberalnego kosmopolityzmu w Stanach Zjednoczonych w ostatnich dziesięcioleciach i wypełnienie luk w literaturze na trzy sposoby. Po pierwsze, proponujemy nową wielowymiarową miarę kosmopolityzmu w oparciu o dane z World Values Surveys; po drugie, staramy się sprawdzić, czy istnieje tendencja do bycia bardziej lub mniej kosmopolitycznym w USA w latach 1982–2017; i po trzecie, badamy, czy istnieją związane z wiekiem różnice w postawach publicznych. Wyniki potwierdzają nasze hipotezy: (1) Ogólne poparcie dla kosmopolityzmu rośnie – nawet w nowym stuleciu w zmienionej atmosferze politycznej. (2) Związane z wiekiem różnice w poparciu dla kosmopolityzmu pogłębiły się w ciągu ostatnich czterech dekad.

Słowa kluczowe

Efekt wieku, kosmopolityzm, globalizacja, USA, szeregi czasowe danych skumulowanych, Trump.